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COMMENT
MODERN-DAY PIRATES:
WHY DOMESTIC PARENT CORPORATIONS
SHOULD BE LIABLE UNDER THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE FOR VIOLATIONS OF
WORKERS’ RIGHTS WITHIN GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAINS
ERIN DOWNEY*
Due to a growing international focus on corporate social responsibility,
transnational corporations increasingly have greater societal and legal duties to
disclose and take responsibility for workers’ rights within their supply chains.
For example, countries have introduced reporting requirements for corporations
of certain sizes, and wronged supply chain workers have successfully brought suit
against transnational parent corporations. In 2018, a United Nations working
group introduced a draft treaty that would hold transnational corporations liable
for human rights violations arising in the context of business operations.
This Comment argues that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is an appropriate
mechanism to provide U.S. courts with jurisdiction over claims that foreign
workers bring against U.S. parent corporations for workers’ rights violations
within supply chains. The ATS provides district courts with jurisdiction over
claims brought by foreign plaintiffs for torts committed in violation of the law of
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nations. Given the growing international trend of holding corporations
responsible for workers’ rights, U.S. courts should recognize a broader array of
actionable torts under the ATS and U.S. parent corporations should reasonably
foresee the risk of workers’ rights violations within their supply chains.
Accordingly, the ATS should remain an available option for foreign workers to
hold U.S. parent corporations responsible for such violations.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2018 the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank,
PLC1 categorically foreclosed the possibility of foreign plaintiffs
bringing suits against foreign corporations in U.S. courts under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).2 Joining a line of Supreme Court precedent
restricting the applicability of the ATS, the Jesner decision further
limited the jurisdictional grant of the ATS to provide recourse for
wronged plaintiffs.3 Writing in dissent, Justice Sotomayor described
the Court’s holding as “absolv[ing] corporations from responsibility
under the ATS for conscience-shocking behavior.”4 Referring to the
appropriate ATS defendants through the lens of international norms
existing at the establishment of the ATS,5 the dissent identified the
lingering question as, “Who are today’s pirates?”6 Who, as Justice
Breyer wrote years before, are the “common enemies of all mankind”?7
Corporations are modern-day pirates, potential common enemies of
mankind. Beasts of business, corporations possess the power to do
both good and bad,8 and they are increasingly independent of
government control.9 As corporations outsource production needs,
1. 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
2. Id. at 1407–08.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
5. See infra Part II (identifying the 1789 ATS-appropriate norms as piracy, safe
conducts, and ambassador rights).
6. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 129 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
7. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 131 (Breyer, J., concurring).
8. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1437 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the power
corporations have to cause suffering by considering the destructive impact of the
Rwandan Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines, which broadcast inflammatory
rhetoric that incited hatred during the Rwandan Genocide).
9. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility,
111 YALE L.J. 443, 463 (2001) (explaining that corporations have power over individuals
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their supply chains become more vast and complex; thus, corporations
continue to expand their global reach and presence.10 Internationally,
States and corporations have recognized the indelible role they now
play in safeguarding basic human rights within these global supply
chains.11 Accordingly, the ATS should remain an available “statute that
helps to protect basic human rights.”12
Despite recent jurisprudence further limiting the scope of the ATS,
this Comment will argue that the ATS is an appropriate mechanism to
provide wronged foreign supply chain workers with their day in court.
Part I will address the histories of supply chains and corporate civil
liability. Part II will discuss the legal framework of the ATS, the seminal
cases that transformed the jurisdictional grant of the ATS, and recent
cases whose legal arguments have relied upon ATS jurisdiction. Part
III will first argue that the practice of corporate responsibility for
workers’ rights violations is crystallizing into a norm of customary
international law. Part III will then analyze why the ATS is well-suited
for global supply chain workers to bring claims against domestic parent
corporations and further suggest that the criteria for actionable ATS
torts should grow to encompass a broader array of torts that supply chain
workers incur in unsafe working conditions, given the international
trend of holding corporations responsible for workers’ rights. This
Comment will assert that the ATS should remain a mechanism through
which U.S. courts have jurisdiction over cases from foreign plaintiffs
holding domestic parent corporations liable for violations of workers’
rights within supply chains, to incentivize greater transparency and
promote the global enforcement of fair working conditions.
I. BACKGROUND
Corporations and human rights are intrinsically linked in modern
society. Historically, corporate acts that directly impacted human rights
could evade governmental regulation or oversight. Today, however, the
balance is starting to favor the worker as States and international bodies

and can transfer their activities to States that have fewer regulatory burdens); see also Kiobel,
569 U.S. at 121 (majority opinion) (“Pirates were fair game wherever found, by any nation,
because they generally did not operate within any jurisdiction.”).
10. Infra Part I.
11. Infra Part I.
12. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES 134 (2015).
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continue to implement guidelines and legislations intended to improve
global working conditions.
A. The Intersection of Supply Chains and Human Rights
Over 450 million people work in global supply-chain related jobs.13
In an increasingly inter-related global economy, supply chains have
become more complex. The International Labour Organization (ILO)
characterizes global supply chains as “the cross-border organization of
the activities required to produce goods or services and bring them to
customers through inputs and various phases of development,
production and delivery.”14 Supply chains emerge through the practice
of outsourcing, whereby a parent company buys goods or services from
outside suppliers rather than producing the goods or services within the
parent company itself.15 Parent companies outsource the production of
a good or service to a subcontractor.16
The impact of supply chains on foreign workers is double-edged. Supply
chain jobs often provide opportunities for foreign workers,17 but the
culture and business practices of subcontractors can have drastic effects on
the workers.18 For example, in 2010, the stressful work environment at
Foxconn, a Chinese subcontracting factory for Apple iPhones, led assembly
13. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUPPLY CHAINS: A CALL FOR A BINDING
GLOBAL STANDARD ON DUE DILIGENCE 2 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/report_pdf/human_rights_in_supply_chains_brochure_lowres_final.pdf.
14. INT’L LABOUR CONF., 105TH SESS., REPORT IV: DECENT WORK IN GLOBAL SUPPLY
CHAINS 1 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf
/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_468097.pdf.
15. See Outsourcing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OFFSHORING AND EMPLOYMENT: TRENDS AND IMPACTS 15
(2007) (“Outsourcing can occur within the country where the enterprise is located
(domestic outsourcing) or abroad (outsourcing abroad).”).
16. INT’L LABOUR ORG., 86TH SESS., REPORT V (2B): CONTRACT LABOUR (1998),
https://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/rep-v2b.htm
(defining subcontractor as “a natural or legal person who undertakes by a contractual
arrangement with a user enterprise to have work performed for that enterprise”).
17. See INT’L LABOUR CONF., PROVISIONAL RECORD, 105TH SESS., REPORTS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DECENT WORK IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: RESOLUTION AND CONCLUSIONS
SUBMITTED FOR ADOPTION BY THE CONFERENCE 2 (2016), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/group
s/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_489115.pdf (recognizing
that global supply chains contribute to economic growth, create jobs, and can have a positive
impact).
18. See id. (emphasizing that global supply chain failures also contribute to
vulnerabilities in labor rights, such as occupational health and underpayment of wages);
see also INT’L LABOUR CONF., supra note 14, at 26 (“The increasing cross-border flows of
workers have also resulted in a greater risk of forced labour and trafficking in persons.”).
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line workers to commit suicide by jumping off the factory rooves.19
Heightened societal interests in sustainability and decent working
conditions have stimulated an interest in “conscious consumption.”20
Consumers’ desires to not mistakenly endorse human rights abuses
through the purchase of commodities have helped to reinvigorate a push
for brands’ transparency about the workings of their supply chains.21
1.

Corporate accountability for supply chain transparency
Internationally, organizations and countries have implemented
action plans and legislation to promote safe working practices. In
1976, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) entered into force.22 State Parties, in their obligation
under the UN Charter to promote universal respect for human rights,
“recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work.”23 Under the ICESCR, favorable
working conditions include safe and healthy working conditions, fair
wages, equal opportunity for promotion, and reasonable rest days.24
Broadly, the ILO’s resolutions and conventions emphasize a
continuing commitment to respect workers’ rights.25 In 1998, the ILO
adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, wherein member states respect and promote the following: the
19. Brian Merchant, Life and Death in Apple’s Forbidden City, GUARDIAN (June 18,
2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/18/foxconnlife-death-forbidden-city-longhua-suicide-apple-iphone-brian-merchant-one-deviceextract (reporting that in 2010 alone, eighteen workers attempted suicide, fourteen
workers died, and Foxconn officials talked down another twenty).
20. Peter Needle, Conscious Consumers, the Transparent Supply Chain and Ethical
Sourcing, BLOG, SEGURA (June 7, 2018), https://www.segura.co.uk/newsroom/
conscious-consumers-transparent-supply-chain-and-ethical-sourcing
(describing
the
“compassionate” or “conscious” consumer as a new type of buyer who considers the societal
impact of the goods she purchases and is interested in the processes that made the product).
21. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(explaining that a California resident sued Nike, alleging that Nike made false
statements or omissions concerning the manufacturing conditions of its products).
22. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
23. 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
24. Id. One hundred sixty-eight States are State Parties, four (including the United
States) are signatories, and twenty-five have taken “No Action.” See Status of
Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: OFF. HIGH COMM’R,
http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited June 1, 2019).
25. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up,
INT’L LABOUR ORG. (June 18, 1998), http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration
/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
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right to collective bargaining, elimination of forced labor, abolition of
child labor, and elimination of discrimination in employment.26 One
187 countries are members of the ILO, and the ILO has eight
fundamental Conventions, two of which the United States has ratified:
the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention and the Worst Forms of
Child Labor Convention.27
The launch of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (UNGPs) in 2011 spurred an international movement toward better
business practices and business responsibility.28 The UNGPs recognize the
important role business corporations play in respecting human rights and
the need for effective remedies upon a breach of their obligations29:
Business enterprises . . . should avoid infringing on the human
rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts
with which they are involved . . . [and] seek to prevent or mitigate
adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their
operations, products or services by their business relationships, even
if they have not contributed to those impacts.30

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) introduced its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises31 in

26. Id. ¶ 2.
27. See Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited June 1,
2019); Conventions and Recommendations, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/
global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-re
commendations/lang--en (last visited June 1, 2019) (listing the subject matter covered
by the eight fundamental Conventions, including the freedom of association and
protection of the right to organize, the right to organize and collective bargaining,
forced labor, abolition of forced labor, minimum age, child labor, equal
remuneration, and employment discrimination); see also Convention Concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, 58 (entered into force
Sept. 15, 1946) (defining forced labor as “all work or service which is extracted from
any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not
offered himself voluntarily”).
28. U.N. Human Rights Council, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (June 16, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Docu
ments/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf; see also UN Office of the High
Comm’r for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/11/04 1 (2011) [hereinafter Implementing UNGPs], http://www.ohchr.org
/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
29. Implementing UNGPs, supra note 28, at 1.
30. Id. at 13.
31. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 9 (2011), http://www.
oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES].
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2011, which encourage business partners, including suppliers and
subcontractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible
Although the Guidelines are legally
with the Guidelines.32
nonbinding, the OECD Investment Committee encourages adhering
member countries, one of which is the United States, to implement
these recommendations.33 In 2018, forty-eight countries adopted and
agreed to support implementing the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines
for Responsible Business Conduct, which is the first governmentbacked standard for corporate due diligence across all economy
sectors and pertains to the human risks within global supply chains.34
The UN Global Compact continues to support the underlying
principle of promoting fair working conditions.35 In 2015, countries
adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, whose
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent a universal
blueprint to build upon the Millennium Development Goals36 and
“balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the
economic, social and environmental” to create decent work for all.37
Goal 8 of the SDGs, Decent Work and Economic Growth, has two
targets that expressly focus on promoting fair working conditions.38
Recently, the UN charged an open-ended intergovernmental
working group with constructing a treaty addressing the intersection
32. Id. at 41 (highlighting corporate responsibility among business partners and
their suppliers, contractors, subcontractors, licensees and other entities).
33. See Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/members
andpartners (last visited June 1, 2019) (listing thirty-six Member countries, ranging
from advanced to emerging countries); see also OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at 9.
34. Countries Commit to Step Up Efforts to Drive More Responsible Business Conduct
Through New OECD Instrument, OECD (May 30, 2018), http://www.oecd.org/inv
estment/mne/countries-commit-to-step-up-efforts-to-drive-more-responsible-business
-conduct-through-new-oecd-instrument.htm [hereinafter New OECD Instrument]
(including as members the OECD countries and various other countries).
35. Infra Section I.B.1.
36. The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were the predecessor to
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The MDGs called for civil organizations
and countries to develop action plans to combat the scourges of poverty, hunger, and
disease by a 2015 target date. See Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), U.N.,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited June 1, 2019).
37. G.A. Res. 70/1, at 3 (Oct. 21, 2015).
38. Sustainable Development Goals, U.N., https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org
/sdgs (last accessed Apr. 19, 2019) [hereinafter “SDGs”] (aiming to achieve productive
employment and decent work for all women and men by 2030); see also G.A. Res. 70/1,
supra note 37, at 29 (calling on businesses and States to foster a “well-functioning
business sector,” act to eliminate modern slavery (Target 8.7), and protect safe and
secure working environments for all workers (Target 8.8)).
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of business enterprises and human rights.39 In 2018, the Permanent
Mission of Ecuador introduced a zero draft of a legally binding
instrument to regulate the transnational activities of corporations and
other enterprises.40 Within the purview of legal liability, Article 10(6)
of the Zero Draft expressly states that those with transnational business
activities shall be liable for human rights violations that arise in the
context of their business operations, including “to the extent risk ha[s]
been foreseen or should have been foreseen of human rights violations
within its chain of economic activity.”41 Such a treaty would serve the
purpose of ensuring that victims of transnational business human
rights violations have effective access to justice and remedies for harms
that they incur while working.42
Regionally, the 2014 European Union (EU) Directive on NonFinancial Reporting encourages EU corporations to disclose the social
and environmental impacts of their business activities within nonfinancial statements.43 The Directive on Non-Financial Reporting
advances the transparency goals of corporate social responsibility and
expressly states that the non-financial statement should include
relevant information about a corporation’s supply and subcontracting
chains to identify and prevent adverse social impacts.44 The nonfinancial reporting requirements should include, at the minimum,

39. Fourth Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS COUNCIL: OFF. HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
HRC/WGTransCorp/Session4/Pages/Session4.aspx (last visited June 1, 2019).
40. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Zero-Draft, Legally
Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, art. 2, ¶ 1 (July 16, 2018)
[hereinafter U.N. Zero-Draft to Regulate Transnational Corporations], https://www
.ohchr.org/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/wgtranscorp/session3/draftlbi.pdf.
41. Id. art. 10, ¶ 6(c).
42. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
43. Non-Financial
Reporting,
EUROPEAN
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing
/company-reporting/non-financial-reporting_en (last accessed Feb. 12, 2019); see also
MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU 5 (2017),
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/NFRpublication%20online_versio
n.pdf. EU directives are legislative acts that put forth goals that all EU countries need
to achieve, but the respective countries have the autonomy to implement laws to attain those
goals. See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/eu-law/legal-acts_en (last updated May 24, 2018).
44. Council Directive 2014/95/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 330) ¶ 6 (Oct. 22, 2014),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095.
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information on social and employee matters and respect for human
rights.45 All EU Member States had incorporated these disclosure rules
through national legislation by the end of 2017.46
Keeping abreast of the broader international movement, individual
States have also taken initiatives to implement national legislation that
focuses on corporate due diligence for working conditions within
supply chains. In 2015, the United Kingdom acted to regulate corporate
disclosure about potential human rights abuses and implemented the
landmark UK Modern Slavery Act (“UK MSA”),47 and in 2017 France
and Germany followed suit by passing the “Loi relative au devoir de
vigilance des sociétés des mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre”48
and the CSR Directive Implementation Act.49 In 2019, Australia introduced
a similar reporting requirement through its own Modern Slavery Act.50
Emerging modern slavery legislation continues to percolate on the
international stage. Most recently, Hong Kong, and Dutch governments
echoed the United Kingdom’s call to attack human rights risks within

45. See Non-Financial Reporting, supra note 43.
46. Innovative Implementation of EU Directive on Non-Financial Reporting, GRI (Feb. 7,
2018) [hereinafter Implementation of EU Directive], https://www.globalreporting.org/
information/news-and-press-center/Pages/EU-Directive-on-Non-Financial-Reporting.aspx.
For example, Denmark built upon an already-existing regulation, the Danish Financial
Statement Act that mandated corporate transparency about sustainability choices, while
Greece imposed transparent reporting requirements on corporations of varying sizes. Id.
47. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (UK) (requiring corporations that
conduct business in the UK and have a global annual turnover of more than £36
million to disclose annually their steps to address slavery in supply chains).
48. Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés des mères
et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 on the corporate duty
of vigilance for parent and instructing companies] (requiring French companies employing
more than five thousand workers domestically or ten thousand worldwide to implement
effective vigilance plans that directly address business-related human rights risks while
mapping supply chain risks for all companies they directly or indirectly control).
49. Gesetz zur Stärkung der nichtfinanziellen Berichterstattung der Unternehmen in
ihren Lage – und Konzernlageberichten [CSR Directive Implementation Act], April 2017,
BGBLI at 802 (GER); see also Robert von Steinau-Steinrück & Stephan Sura, Do Good—And
be Obliged to Talk About It? LAB. L. MAG. (June 26, 2017), https://www.laborlawmagazine.com/2017/06/26/do-good-and-be-obliged-to-talk-about-it (explaining that the
German Act obligates certain corporations to disclose their corporate social responsibility
efforts, and that the disclosures must contain information regarding workers’ issues and
respect for human rights).
50. Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) (Austl), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details
/C2018A00153 (mandating that companies produce annual statements detailing their
supply chain operations, slavery risks, and efforts to combat those slavery risks).
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supply chains.51 Pending enactment, the laws would respectively combat
modern-day slavery through public statements, civil actions against
involved parties, and plans to eradicate child labor from supply chains.52
The trend continues to spread as other countries consider implementing
anti-slavery, pro-due diligence legislation for national corporations that
conduct business activities abroad.53
2.

Domestic efforts
The U.S. government’s response to addressing supply chain human
rights abuses has primarily manifested in the form of regulation and
disclosure laws. At the federal level, the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) places due diligence requirements on the supply chain activities
of government contractors with particular emphasis on eradicating
human trafficking.54 The government implemented FAR to combat
human trafficking in federal contracting, after President Obama’s
Executive Order 13627, “Strengthening Protections against Trafficking
in Persons in Federal Contracts,”55 bolstered the government’s

51. Julia Steinhardt & Hannah Edmonds-Camara, Developments in Modern Slavery
Regulation: U.K., Hong Kong and Australia, COVINGTON: GLOBAL POL’Y WATCH (July 12,
2018), https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2018/07/developments-in-modern-slav
ery-regulation-u-k-hong-kong-and-australia.
52. See id. (noting the Hong Kong bill would require companies to publish annual
slavery statements and allow victims to bring civil actions against those who benefitted
from involvement in a venture that they should have known involved slavery); Gerard
Oonk, Child Labour Due Diligence Law for Companies Adopted by Dutch Parliament, INDIA
COMM. NETH. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.indianet.nl/170208e.html (illustrating how
the Dutch law requires corporations to examine whether their supply chains contain
child labor and, if they do, implement action plans to eradicate such labor).
53. See, e.g., Switzerland Considers Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Legislation,
ASSENT BLOG (June 22, 2018), https://blog.assentcompliance.com/index.php/switz
erland-considers-mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence-legislation (proposing legislation
that would compel Swiss companies in high-risk sectors to undertake human rights due
diligence in their foreign business activities and include parent company liability);
Michael Torrance, Canada Must Develop a National Plan on Responsible Business and
Human Rights, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
report-on-business/rob-commentary/canada-must-develop-a-national-plan-on-respon
sible-business-and-human-rights/article36117097 (calling for the Canadian government to
develop a national action plan on business responsibility to stay in-line with global standards).
54. See generally FAR 52.222-50 (2015) (prohibiting government contractors from
engaging in human trafficking and using forced labor in the execution of their
contracted work).
55. Exec. Order No. 13,627, 3 C.F.R. § 13627 (2013). In 1999, President Clinton
also relied on his Executive Order power to introduce Executive Order No. 13,126,
“Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child
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approach to not tolerating trafficking.56 FAR requires contractors to
certify that they have implemented compliance plans to prevent the
occurrence of prohibited acts, and the rule contains “flow-down
provisions” through which contractors will be responsible for the acts
and omissions of subcontractors and agents at every tier of the supply
chain.57 Accordingly, contractors need to verify that they have
conducted due diligence and none of their agents or subcontractors
are involved in trafficking-related activities.58
Perhaps more well-known, § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)59 is an
example of regulating supply chains due to likely human rights
violations associated with conflict minerals.60 Under the Dodd-Frank
Act, all publicly traded U.S. corporations must annually disclose
whether any of their products contain conflict minerals.61 Efforts to
minimize connections to tainted goods later led to the Trade
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA),62 which
stipulates that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can enforce
regulations that govern imports and exports.63

Labor,” which was intended to ensure that federal agencies do not obtain goods made
by forced or child labor. 3 C.F.R. § 13126 (2000).
56. Final FAR Rule Released, VERITÉ, https://www.verite.org/final-far-rule-released; see
also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, tit.
XVII, § 1702, 126 Stat. 1632, 2093 (requiring contractors to take specific preventative
measures to eliminate human trafficking and forced labor in supply chains).
57. See Final FAR Rule Released, supra note 56 (imposing obligations on contractors
with more than $500,000 worth of work abroad).
58. See id. (recognizing that if said agents or subcontractors are involved in
trafficking practices, the contractors must take remedial or legal action).
59. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
60. § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m note (2012)).
61. J. Anthony Hardenburgh, Why Supply Chains Cannot Turn a Blind Eye to Sourcing Despite
Regulatory Shifts, SUPPLY CHAIN DIVE (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.supplychai ndive.com/news
/conflict-minerals-sourcing-risk-supply-chain-Dodd-Frank/437593 (defining “conflict minerals”
as minerals whose trade funds millions of dollars channeled to armed rebels and insurgents,
primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo).
62. Pub. L. No. 114-125, tit. I, 130 Stat. 122 (2016) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4454 (Supp. IV 2016)).
63. § 101, 130 Stat. at 127; see also Claire Reade & Samuel Witten, Understanding the
US Ban on Importing Forced Labor Goods, ARNOLD & PORTER (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/04/understand
ing-the-us-ban-forced-labor-goods (discussing that Border Patrol had undertaken four
enforcement actions against imports with forced labor concerns).
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By way of pending legislation, the Business Supply Chain Transparency
on Trafficking and Slavery Act, a proposed bill introduced in both the
House and Senate, would require corporations to annually disclose their
efforts to identify and combat supply chain abuses.64 If enacted into law,
the bill would require public companies with over $100 million in global
gross receipts to publicly disclose—as part of their annual reports to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—their efforts to prevent
human trafficking, slavery, and child labor within their supply chains.65
Most recently, President Trump introduced his own Executive
Order to address global corrupt practices. Executive Order 13,818,
“Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights
Abuses or Corruption,”66 strengthens implementation of the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Global Magnitsky Act)67 by
seeking to “impose tangible and significant consequences on those who
commit serious human rights abuses.”68 Congress passed the Global
Magnitsky Act in 2016, authorizing the President to impose sanctions
against human rights violators with the capacity to target conduct by
former or current government officials anywhere in the world.69
Supply chain awareness persists beyond the purview of federal and
executive action. On a state level, California became the first, and
remains the only, state that has directly implemented disclosure

64. Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2018,
H.R. 7089, 115th Cong.
65. See id. § 2 (expressing the sense of Congress that such legislation would prevent
businesses from inadvertently endorsing products tainted by human rights violations
within their supply chains, while providing consumers with information on products
free of violations).
66. Exec. Order No. 13,818, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,839 (2018).
67. Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1261, 130 Stat. 2000, 2533 (2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2656).
68. 82 Fed. Reg. at 60,839. See generally Rob Berschinski, Trump Administration
Notches a Serious Human Rights Win. No, Really., JUST SECURITY (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/50846/trump-administration-notches-human-rights-win
-no-really (remarking upon the surprise that the Trump administration designated
human rights abusers under an executive order tied to the elective authority of the
Global Magnitsky Act).
69. See Global Magnitsky Act § 1263, 130 Stat. at 2534; see also Press Statement from
Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.state.gov/secretary/2017
2018tillerson/remarks/2017/12/276723.htm (expressing that the sanctions
demonstrate the United States will continue to pursue consequences for those who
commit serious human rights violations); Berschinski, supra note 68 (detailing how the
Global Magnitsky Act could hold officials accountable).
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requirements as a tool to combat the continuation of workers’ abuses.70
Under the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act,71 large
retailers and manufacturers doing business in California with annual
worldwide gross receipts exceeding $100 million must provide
consumers with information about their efforts to end human
trafficking and slavery within their supply chains.72 Privately, individual
corporations have begun to pick up the torch to mitigate their supply
chain abuses by voluntarily modifying their fundamental working
principles or codes of conduct.73 The heightened efforts to eradicate
forced labor from production have transitively implicated pushes for
more, or fully, transparent supply chains.74
The ABA Business Law Section created the Working Group to Draft
Human Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts
(“Working Group”) to spearhead such an effort.75 With an aim to
achieve “protection that is legally effective and operationally likely,”76
the Working Group proposed Model Contract Clauses (“MCCs”) that
could help companies comply with an increasing amount of human
rights-focused legislation and minimize corporate risk.77 The Working

70. Client Alert: The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, LATHAM & WATKINS
(Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/california-transparency-insupply-chains-act-2010.
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2019).
72. See § 1714.43(a)(1) (“Retailers to disclose efforts to eradicate slavery and
human trafficking from direct supply chain for tangible goods”).
73. See generally CONSUMER GOODS F., BUS. ACTIONS AGAINST FORCED LAB. (2017),
https://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/The-Con
sumer-Goods-Forum-Social-Sustainability-Business-Actions-Against-Forced-Labour-Bo
oklet.pdf (identifying Danone, Kellogg’s, and MARS as corporations that transformed
codes of conduct or implemented action plans to combat potential supply chain abuses).
74. Cf. The Hidden Cost of Jewelry: Human Rights in Supply Chains and the Responsibility
of Jewelry Companies, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2018/02/08/hidden-cost-jewelry/human-rights-supply-chains-and-responsibil
ity-jewelry (describing how Cartier and Chopard have “full chain of custody” for
portions of their gold supplies, whereas Tiffany and Co. can trace all of its newly mined
gold back to a single source).
75. David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International
Supply Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk: 2018 Report and Model
Contract Clauses from the Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International
Supply Contracts, ABA Business Law Section, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093, 1093 (2018).
76. Id. at 1094.
77. Id. at 1095.

2019]

MODERN-DAY PIRATES

1947

Group designed the MCCs to protect workers by applying to corporate
policies that address a broad range of human rights issues.78
B. History of Corporate Liability
Judicial systems across the world continue to interpret the question of
corporate “personhood” under the law. International courts have
increasingly exercised jurisdiction over corporations for civil actions, and
domestic courts have begun to more readily recognize civil corporate liability.
1.

Internationally
The international community now recognizes the capacity to hold
corporations directly responsible for civil violations,79 and transnational
corporations (“TNCs”)80 have direct duties under certain multilateral
conventions.81 That TNCs have the power to enforce their rights,
78. Id. at 1094. Additional commentary on international supply chains and the
MCCs by members of the Working Group can be found in this symposium issue. See
generally Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights: Looking to Version 2.0 of the ABA
Model Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519 (2019); E. Christopher Johnson Jr. et.al,
The Business Case for Lawyers to Advocate for Corporate Supply Chains Free of Labor Trafficking
and Child Labor, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1555 (2019); Ramona L. Lampley, Mitigating Risk,
Eradicating Slavery, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1707 (2019); Jonathan C. Lipson, Something Else:
Specific Relief for Breach of Human Rights Terms in Supply Chain Agreements, 68 AM. U. L.
REV. 1751 (2019); Jennifer S. Martin, Private Law Remedies, Human Rights, and Supply
Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1781 (2019); Roza Pati, Global Regulation of Corporate
Conduct: Effective Pursuit of a Slave-Free Supply Chain, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1821 (2019);
David V. Snyder, The New Social Contracts in International Supply Chains, 68 AM. U. L. REV.
1869 (2019).
79. Ratner, supra note 9, at 450; see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11,
53–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Legal systems throughout the world recognize that corporate
legal responsibility is part and parcel of the privilege of corporate personhood.”),
vacated by 527 F. App’x 7 (mem.) (D.C. Cir. 2013).
80. See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 909 (2003) (“[A]n economic entity operating in more than one
country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries—
whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and
whether taken individually or collectively.” (quoting Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003))).
81. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 946
(2004) (showcasing the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage and the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment as examples of treaties that directly impose liability on
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through mechanisms like arbitration or dispute resolution proceedings,
indicates an international legal personality.82 David Scheffer, in his
amicus brief in support of the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.83
petitioners, emphasized the consensus at the negotiations for the Rome
Statute that corporate civil—but not criminal—liability stood as a
recognized, general principle of law.84
International organizations have also introduced initiatives with the
intent to influence business practices. In 1999, the UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan proposed a “Global Compact” of shared values,
which encouraged businesses to voluntarily support and adopt nine key
principles, addressing general human rights obligations, environmental
protection, and labor standards.85 In 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved “Norms on
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,” which, although not a treaty
and accordingly not binding, the UN intended to also apply to domestic
enterprises when relevant.86
Legal systems of individual States have permitted lawsuits that
necessitate some finding of corporate liability or shared responsibility
to the extent that courts may exercise jurisdiction.87 In 2015, a German
court exercised jurisdiction over a compensation claim that survivors
of a Pakistan factory fire brought against KiK, a German corporation
that was the factory’s main customer.88 In the same year, an appeals
court in The Hague ruled that Royal Dutch Shell could be liable for
the actions of its Nigerian subsidiary, when Nigerian farmers filed suit
corporations, as legal persons); see also Phillip C. Jessup, The Subjects of a Modern Law of
Nations, 45 MICH. L. REV. 383, 387 (1947) (“Corporations or partnerships may also be
subjects of international law.”).
82. See Ratner, supra note 9, at 459.
83. 569 U.S. 108 (2013); see also infra Section III.C.2.
84. Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University School of Law,
as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 3–5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 2743194.
85. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 80, at 903 (recognizing that this initiative
failed to “bind all business to follow minimum human rights standards”).
86. Id. at 901.
87. See infra Section III.C.
88. The 2012 fire at Ali Enterprise’s factory killed over 260 people, and KiK
publicly acknowledged that the factory manufactured most of its products. The
survivors alleged that KiK shared responsibility for the factor’s lack of fire safety
measures.
Time Line of the Ali Enterprises Case, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN,
https://cleanclothes.org/safety/ali-enterprises/time-line-for-the-ali-enterprises-case
(last visited June 1, 2019).

2019]

MODERN-DAY PIRATES

1949

for the destructive pollution from oil spills.89 Within the United
Kingdom, a court upheld claims that Zambian citizens brought against
Vedanta Resources for injuries stemming from pollution and damages
of copper mine discharges.90 The court reasoned that since Vedanta
was the holding company of the mine and thus had superior
knowledge, Vedanta would be better suited to protect the subsidiary’s
employees against the risks of injury.91
2.

Domestically
Domestically, “[t]he idea that corporations are ‘persons’ with duties,
liabilities, and rights has a long history in American domestic law.”92
During apartheid in South Africa, U.S. corporations with affiliates in
South Africa signed on to an agreement that called for the equal
treatment of non-white employees. The Sullivan Principles, as this
agreement came to be known, constituted a voluntary code of conduct
designed to promote equal employment practices of U.S. corporations
operating in South Africa. By signing on to the agreement, U.S.
corporations affirmed their support for a high standard of labor
practices that could contribute to ending apartheid.93
Case law demonstrates that U.S. plaintiffs face difficulties in
“piercing the corporate veil” and convincing a court to exercise

89. See Dutch Appeals Court Says Shell May be Held Liable for Oil Spills in Nigeria,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2015, 8:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2015/dec/18/dutch-appeals-court-shell-oil-spills-nigeria
(upholding
jurisdiction because the court could not prematurely ascertain whether Shell was not
liable for possible negligence of its Nigerian subsidiary).
90. Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC, [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [1–7].
91. Id. at [82]. To ascertain whether a parent company owed a duty of care, the
court suggested a three-part test of foreseeability, proximity, and reasonableness. Id.
at [69]; see also id. at [75] (referencing Lubbe v. Cape PLC, Lubbe v. Cape PLC, [2000]
UKHL 41, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545, wherein the court held that it was appropriate to find
a parent corporation had a duty of care to advise the subsidiary on steps to take for
asbestos, given the parent’s superior knowledge of the factory and management).
92. Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations
of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World,
46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 225 n.278 (2014) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013)).
93. The (Sullivan) Statement of Principles (Fourth Amplification), Nov. 8, 1984,
reprinted in Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in
South Africa, 24 I.L.M. 1496 (1985) [hereinafter Sullivan Principles] (recognizing the
importance of actively countering human rights violations and not just passively engaging).
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jurisdiction.94 In Daimler AG v. Bauman,95 the Supreme Court limited
situations in which federal and state courts can exercise personal
jurisdiction over a corporation by stating that jurisdiction is likely
limited to the state or country where the corporation is incorporated
or headquartered.96 Judicial hesitancy to exercise jurisdiction over
corporations can also stem from reticence to interfere with foreign
policy if the corporation is foreign.97
Increasingly, scholars have considered tort modes of liability as
feasible methods of holding corporations responsible for the acts of
their associates.98 Scholars have proffered the possibility of direct
liability99 or the agency principle. The agency principle could impose
liability based on contract concepts and find the parent corporation
liable for the acts of a subsidiary “agent” that was under its control.100

94. See Skinner, supra note 92, at 212–13, 216–17 (noting that human rights
practitioners have been unsuccessful in asserting claims on “piercing the corporate
veil” but have sometimes succeeded on agency theory claims); see also MICHAEL
KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: ENFORCEMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH US TORTS LAW 285 (2009) (“[T]he doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is an equitable concept which constitutes a judicial
exception to limited liability,” by which judges hold the parent company responsible).
95. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
96. See id. at 139 n.20.
97. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014)
(noting the case does not implicate problems with bringing foreign nationals into U.S.
courts because the defendants are citizens).
98. See generally Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 207, 209 (2008) (exploring the relationship between corporate engagement and
corporate liability under the ATS); Matthew E. Danforth, Note, Corporate Civil Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute: Exploring Its Possibility and Jurisdictional Limitations, 44
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 659, 662 (2011) (arguing that human rights victims may be able to
recover from corporations under the ATS).
99. See Jennifer M. Green, Corporate Tort: International Human Rights and Superior
Officers, 17 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 447, 450 (2017) (describing direct liability as the concept of
“holding corporate officers liable for their role in human rights violations when they had
a direct role” in the violations). For an international example, England’s Companies Act
of 2006 allowed for foreign direct liability: a parent corporation owes a duty of care to a
subsidiary’s employees or anyone impacted by the subsidiary’s actions if the parent
corporation is directly involved with the subsidiary’s actions or exercises de facto control
over the actions. Id. at 459 (citing Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 1159 (U.K.)).
100. See KOEBELE, supra note 94, at 297 & n.86 (citing THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1.01) (explaining that agency law imposes liability based on
contract law concepts and may make the parent corporation, as the principal,
responsible for obligations of the subsidiary, as the agent acting under the control of
the parent corporation).
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II. ATS LITIGATION
A. Historical and Legal Foundations
Originally part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,101 the ATS, also known
as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),102 provides that “the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”103 The First Congress enacted the ATS to protect
the United States from liability for violations of international norms by
holding individuals, rather than the then-young nation, responsible
for violations of such norms committed against other nations or their
citizens.104 The ATS allowed Congress to comply with the United States’
obligation to rectify its citizens’ violations of the law of nations.105
The term “law of nations” denotes “international law,” which
imposes obligations that can govern the behavior of States and private
actors.106 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ Statute), the foremost enumeration of international law
sources, lists four distinct sources from which international law could
arise: (1) international conventions; (2) “international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”; (3) general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) judicial decisions and
teachings of highly qualified publicists.107

101. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 775 n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (noting that the Alien Tort Statute and Alien Tort Claims Act can be used
interchangeably).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see also BREYER, supra note 12, at 135 (defining a tort as “a civil
wrong causing injury”).
104. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of
Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 449 (noting that in 1789 the United States was a young
and weak country, and the First Congress wished to prevent conflict with other nations).
105. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 104, at 449.
106. See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1420 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 49 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W.
Johnson 1863) (defining the law of nations as “the science which teaches the rights subsisting
between nations or States, and the obligations correspondent to those rights”).
107. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060.
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Binding international legal “norms”108 create, change, or terminate
duties for States.109 Binding legal norms primarily derive from
conventions, such as treaties that States have ratified, or customary
international law, which consists of norms that are not codified but
nevertheless are the product of “general and consistent practice of
[S]tates followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”110
Essentially, States observe customary rules because they consider those
rules to be binding.111 When plaintiffs bring ATS suits, the plaintiffs
allege that the defendant committed a tort that violated the law of
nations—generally meaning that the committed tort violated a
substantive prohibition on particular conduct, and under
international law that prohibition was legally binding.112
Absent a treaty, custom can give rise to legally binding norms
through the existence of State practice and opinio juris.113 State practice
need not be universal, but such practice must be general, consistent,
and representative “at least of all major political and socio-economic
systems.”114 Diplomatic acts and instructions, public measures and acts,
and official statements of policy, whether unilateral or undertaken in
cooperation with other States, can characterize a growing State
108. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (contextualizing “norm”
as referring to substantive conduct within international law); see also Ann Florini, The
Evolution of International Norms, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 363, 364–65 (1996) (referring to a
“norm” as a standard of behavior that States obey because they view it as legitimate).
109. See MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 6 (2d ed. 1997) (articulating
that some binding legal norms are peremptory, meaning that they are non-derogable;
some legal norms are non-peremptory and those from which States can derogate, although
not unilaterally; and soft law, in comparison, is comprised of rules that States follow merely
out of utility or for persuasiveness, but the rules do not legally bind the States).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
111. ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 50 (7th ed. 2012); see also
VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 58 (stating that the binding force of treaties and customary
law “must be identical”).
112. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (introducing the norms
against genocide, slavery, and torture as examples of such substantive prohibitions that
international law considers binding).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. c.
114. VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 29; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. b (presenting that State practice can
be general even if not universally followed, but the practice should have a wide
acceptance among States particularly involved in the relevant activity).
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practice.115 Of equal importance, opinio juris is the State’s conviction
that it follows a certain practice as a matter of law, rather than out of
comity.116 For example, a State’s express statement that a particular
rule is obligatory or customary can provide clear evidence of the State’s
legal conviction, as can votes that States cast during the UN drafting
process.117 A State that persistently objects, however, is not bound by
an eventual customary rule if the State has consistently maintained its
objections since the rule began to form.118
To assert jurisdiction under the ATS, then, plaintiffs must prove that
the alleged tort violated a norm of international law.119 Supreme Court
jurisprudence has narrowed the applicable scope of international law,
but the text of the ATS only requires that international law universally
condemns the alleged conduct.120
B. Cases that Defined the Modern Scope of the ATS
Plaintiffs rarely invoked the ATS until the 1980s, when lower courts
started to hear claims that relied on the ATS as an avenue for foreign
citizens to sue other foreign citizens for violations of international law
that occurred on foreign soil.121
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,122 Paraguayan citizens sued a Paraguayan
official whom they claimed tortured and killed their son.123 Employing
an expansive approach to the ATS, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that the ATS permitted federal jurisdiction when

115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. b. See generally VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 17–29 (including the following
as examples of State practice: opinions of national legal advisors, verbal statements,
and national legislation).
116. See VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 48 (promoting the importance of opinio juris as
a way of “asking whether a practice is law, or mere usage or comity, or even
accidental”); CLAPHAM, supra note 111, at 57 (“Custom in its legal sense means
something more than mere habit or usage . . . .”).
117. See VILLAGER, supra note 109, at 50–51.
118. See id. at 34.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022
(9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]nternational law controls the threshold question of whether an
international legal norm provides the basis for an ATS claim . . . .”).
120. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1421 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
121. See generally Bellia & Clark, supra note 104, at 458 (discussing the modern
expansion of the ATS).
122. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
123. Id. at 878 (contending that appellee Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, an
Inspector General of Police, tortured Joelito Filartiga to death).

1954

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1933

a foreign citizen sued for a violation of the law of nations.124 In so doing,
the Filartiga court introduced the threshold question for ATS claims:
whether the alleged conduct violates the law of nations.125 The court
found that torture fit within the law of nations, given that modern
international law prohibited torture and the international community
universally abhorred torture.126 The court looked to numerous
international agreements to verify the universal condemnation of torture
and ultimately deemed that the law of nations “may be ascertained by
consulting the work of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by
the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law.”127 Granting that the “alien”
appellants properly brought the ATS action in federal court for a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations, the court reaffirmed the
jurisdictional standard under the ATS: “It is only where the nations of
the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not
merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that
a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation
within the meaning of the statute.”128 According to the Second Circuit,
“the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”129
More than two decades after the Second Circuit decided Filartiga,
the Supreme Court first reviewed the jurisdictional scope of the ATS
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.130 Respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain,
a Mexican physician, brought a suit against petitioner Jose Francisco
Sosa, alleging that Sosa violated the norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest
and detention when Sosa and others abducted Alvarez-Machain and
brought him from Mexico to Texas, where federal officers arrested

124. Id. at 887.
125. Id. at 880; see also infra notes 145–51 and accompanying text (examining the
Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.).
126. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (considering that the constitutions of over fifty-five
nations expressly or implicitly prohibited torture, while the U.S. State Department
reported a general recognition of the principle against torture).
127. Id. at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61
(1820)); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (exemplifying the
principle that courts must interpret international law as it has evolved and exists
today); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Customary international law results from a general
and consistent practice of States followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”).
128. Id. at 888.
129. Id. at 890.
130. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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him.131 Considering whether the courts could recognize new,
enforceable international norms in ATS lawsuits, the Supreme Court
found that as a jurisdictional grant, the ATS action must “rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the [eighteenth
century] paradigms we have recognized.”132 Absent an established rule
of international law, Alvarez-Machain attempted to demonstrate that
the prohibition against arbitrary arrest amounted to binding
customary international law.133 Although Alvarez-Machain cited two
international agreements—the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)—to support his customary international law argument,
neither instrument created enforceable obligations for the United
States,134 and the Court reasoned that Alvarez-Machain cited little
authority to support his claim of a binding customary norm.135
Ultimately, the Court found that a single illegal detention for less than
one day, accompanied by a lawful transfer to authorities, did not
violate a norm of international law so well defined as to permit a
federal remedy through the ATS.136
Adhering to the Supreme Court’s decision that the ATS only
provides jurisdiction over violations of specific international norms,
the Second Circuit analyzed the creation of such a norm in Abdullahi

131. Id. at 697–99. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) asked for the Mexican
government’s assistance in bringing Alvarez-Machain to the United States, where a
federal grand jury had indicted him for the 1985 torture and murder of a DEA agent.
Id. at 697–98. When the negotiations with the Mexican government continued to stall,
the DEA hired Mexican nationals (one of whom was Sosa) to abduct Alvarez-Machain
from his house and bring him to the United States. Id. at 698.
132. Id. at 725. In the eighteenth century, at the time of the enactment of the ATS,
the international community considered the three principal offenses against the law
of nations to be: (1) violations of safe conducts; (2) infringement of ambassador
rights; and (3) piracy. Id. at 724. William Blackstone reasoned that violations of the
law of nations, particularly the principal offenses, would result in war if they were
attributable to whole States or nations. See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *68 (Wayne Morrison ed. 2001).
133. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735.
134. See id. at 734–35. (differentiating that the Declaration does not impose its own
obligations as a matter of international law and the Covenant, while binding, cannot
create enforceable obligations because the United States ratified the Covenant with
the understand that it would not be self-executing).
135. Id. at 736.
136. Id. at 738.
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ex rel. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.137 In Abdullahi, Nigerian children and their
guardians sued Defendant Pfizer, alleging that Pfizer violated a
customary international law norm prohibiting involuntary medical
experimentation on humans by using children to test experimental
antibiotics without the children’s consent or knowledge.138 The
Second Circuit reversed the district court and held that the prohibition
against nonconsensual medical experimentation fulfilled the Sosa
stipulations for a law of nations norm.139 The court referred to the ICJ
Statute, which binds all UN members as parties, to identify authorities
that provide proof of the sources of international law: international
conventions, custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations, and judicial decisions.140
To analyze whether the prohibition amounted to a well-defined and
universal norm, the court considered international and domestic
actions.141 In the United States, patient-subject consent has been
required in drug research since 1962, when Congress mandated it; the
FDA passed regulations regarding informed consent; and the
government generally attributed importance to this norm.142
International actions further supported the norm: in 2001, European
Parliament and the Council of the EU passed a Directive requiring
member States to adopt rules protecting those incapable of giving
informed consent.143 Additionally, since 1997, thirty-four member
States of the Council of Europe had signed the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, a binding convention and source of
customary international law.144
In 2013, the Supreme Court further narrowed the reach of the ATS
when it decided Kiobel and invoked the presumption against
extraterritoriality to restrict foreign access to U.S. courts.145 Nigerian
nationals sued Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations under the
ATS, alleging that the corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 183–84.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013).
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government in violating the law of nations.146 The Court focused on
the following questions: (1) whether the law of nations recognizes
corporate liability and (2) whether, and under what circumstances, the
ATS allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the
law of nations occurring within a territory of a foreign sovereign.147
Significantly, the Court identified a link between the ATS and a
presumption against extraterritoriality: even when claims “touch and
concern” the United States, the claims need to do so with “sufficient force
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”148 In
this case, all of the relevant conduct occurred outside of the United
States, the petitioners were foreign, and the respondents were foreign
companies.149 Concerned with the ramifications of judicial interference
in foreign policy,150 the Court declined to find that the petitioners’
claims, and mere corporate presence in the United States, overcame the
presumption against extraterritoriality.151
C. Modern ATS litigation and Corporate Defendants
Post-Kiobel litigation heralded a circuit split over ATS jurisdiction and a
continuing debate over whether the ATS applies broadly to both
individuals and legal persons.152 After the Court foreclosed plaintiffs’
ability to bring suit against a foreign corporation because the corporation
lacked sufficient ties to U.S. soil, the circuit courts diverged over how to

146. See id. at 111–13 (stating that the respondents provided Nigerian forces with food
and compensation while the Nigerian forces attacked Ogoni villages and killed residents).
147. Id. at 114 (announcing that the Court heard oral argument again and would
affirm the judgment below based on its answer to the second question).
148. Id. at 124–25.
149. Id. at 113.
150. Id. at 124 (discussing the possibility that other nations could hale U.S. citizens into their
courts for allegedly violating the law of nations, if the Court were to accept jurisdiction).
151. Id. at 124–25. In his concurrence, however, Justice Kennedy seemed to shy
away from categorically preventing extraterritorial application and expressed that
other cases may arise with serious allegations of international law violations that would
warrant a proper deliberation over whether to grant jurisdiction under the ATS. Id.
at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152. See Heather Cohen, The Drafters Knew Best: Corporate Liability and the Alien Tort
Statute, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 14, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/09/14/thedrafters-knew-best-corporate-liability-and-the-alien-tort-statute
(examining
the
language and historical context of the ATS to determine that the drafters intended to
place no limitation on who could be sued, even emphasizing that in 1666 a man
successfully sued the East India Company).
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characterize the scope of the ATS.153 The contested question became
whether corporations could be defendants under the ATS.
A series of successive cases highlighted the discord over the scope of
ATS jurisdiction. In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.,154 the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s employees’ abusive treatment
of Abu Ghraib prisoners violated the law of nations, including the
prohibition against torture.155 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the ATS provided a cause of action even though the
acts occurred on foreign soil because: (1) the alleged torture occurred
at a U.S. government-operated military facility and was perpetrated by
U.S. citizens who were employed by the defendant; (2) the defendant
was a U.S. corporation; and (3) the U.S. Department of the Interior
issued the defendant’s performance contract to conduct interrogations
at Abu Ghraib.156 The court noted that further litigation, the result of
granting jurisdiction under the ATS, would also not interfere with
foreign policy because the political branches had already indicated that
the United States would not tolerate acts of torture.157
In Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc.,158 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered a class action filed by former Ivorian child slaves
against Nestlé for allegedly aiding and abetting child slavery by
sourcing cheap cocoa from Ivorian farms.159 After holding that the
norm against slavery was universal and could be brought against the
corporate defendants,160 the Ninth Circuit ultimately declined to
decide whether the presumption against extraterritoriality barred the
claim, and it remanded the complaint for plaintiffs to amend to allege
that some of the underlying activity took place in the United States.161
In Doe v. Drummond Co.,162 the Eleventh Circuit determined that U.S.
corporate status was relevant to Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test
153. See Skinner, supra note 92, at 197–200 (noting that the Kiobel Court left open
the possibility that claims touching and concerning the U.S. with sufficient force could
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality).
154. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
155. Id. at 521–22, 525.
156. See id. at 529–31 (deeming that the ATS claims involved “substantial ties” to the
United States).
157. Id. at 530.
158. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
159. Id. at 1017.
160. See id. at 1022 (finding support for corporate liability for slavery offenses in the statutes
of international tribunals and liability for private and non-State actors at Nuremberg).
161. Id. at 1028–29.
162. 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015).
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because the extraterritorial application could be assuaged or
inapplicable, given that the court would not be haling foreign
nationals into U.S. courts to defend themselves.163 In Drummond, the
plaintiff brought the action on behalf of more than 100 Colombian
citizens killed in an armed conflict with the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia, a Colombian paramilitary group, and filed against multiple
defendants, including an Alabama-based coal mining company.164 The
ATS claim put forth that the U.S. citizens aided and abetted or
contributed to human rights violations outside the United States.165
The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs may pursue claims against
corporations, based on both direct and indirect theories of liability.166
However, although the court found that the (1) U.S. citizenship and
corporate status of the defendant, (2) U.S. interests implicated by the
claims, and (3) alleged U.S. conduct were relevant in considering
whether claims “touch and concern” the United States, the court
concluded that the factors were not sufficient to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality.167
The most recent Supreme Court decision involving the ATS, Jesner,
ultimately serves to further limit corporate liability under the statute.
The petitioners, victims who were injured or killed in foreign terrorist
attacks, sought to impose liability on Arab Bank—a Jordanian
institution with a New York branch—for its role in facilitating or
causing those terrorist attacks.168 The international legal and human
rights community hoped that the Supreme Court decision would
affirm that corporations were appropriate ATS defendants.169
However, the majority framed its analysis to ascertain whether

163. Id. at 593–94.
164. Id. at 579.
165. Id. at 582.
166. Id. at 584.
167. Id. at 600.
168. 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018).
169. See, e.g., Sarah A. Altschuller, Corporate Liability and the Alien Tort Statute:
Highlights from the Oral Arguments in Jesner v. Arab Bank, CORP. SOC. RESP. & L. (Oct. 12,
2017),
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2017/10/12/jesner-v-arab-bank-highlightsfrom-the-oral-arguments (addressing the concerns of several Justices about the foreign
relations implications of the ATS); John Bellinger & Andy Wang, Jesner v. Arab Bank:
The Supreme Court Should Not Miss the Opportunity to Clarify the “Touch and Concern” Test,
LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:12 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/jesner-v-arabbank-supreme-court-should-not-miss-opportunity-clarify-touch-and-concern-test
(arguing that the Supreme Court should clarify the touch and concern standard for
determining whether the ATS will apply).
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international law evinced a Sosa-level norm of holding corporations
liable for human rights abuses and weighed whether Congress would
be better suited to decide on a practice of corporate liability.170
Ultimately, the majority looked to the language and purpose of the
ATS to deny corporate liability, holding that foreign plaintiffs cannot
sue foreign corporations under the ATS.171 Notably, the Court
declined to expressly foreclose the ability to bring ATS claims against
domestic corporations for foreign human rights abuses.172
In contrast, the dissent criticized the majority for categorically
absolving foreign corporations of responsibility under the ATS.173 The
dissent argued that the majority incorrectly applied the first part of
Sosa, because the majority asked whether “a specific, universal, and
obligatory norm of corporate liability” existed while Sosa’s “normspecific first step” focuses on substantive norms of international law
that prohibit certain conduct.174 Rather than whether international
law evinced a specific and universal norm of corporate liability, the
dissent characterized the inquiry as whether the law demonstrates any
reason why the ATS would distinguish between a corporation and
natural person who allegedly violated the law of nations.175 Although
the Sosa precedent requires an international consensus about the
violated norm, it does not require an international consensus that
corporate liability is a norm as universal and specific as the main three
norms identified in Sosa.176 The dissent looked to States’ collective and
individual enforcement actions to determine that corporations are
subject to certain international law obligations, noting that various

170. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407. Concurring justices reached the same conclusion and
found that recognizing a new cause of action would have been inappropriate because
doing so would implicate foreign policy concerns and disrupt the balance of powers.
Id. at 1408–10 (Alito, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 1407–08 (majority opinion) (naming the political branches as the bodies
to decide whether the ATS should provide a remedy against foreign corporations,
given that doing so could provide other countries with the equivocal right to hale U.S.
citizens into foreign courts).
172. Id. at 1407 (“[T]the Court holds that foreign corporations may not be
defendants in suits brought under the ATS.”).
173. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1419–20.
175. Id. at 1425. As for the first step of the ATS analysis, determining whether the
violated norm is Sosa-specific, the dissent would remand to the Court of Appeals to
address whether the prohibition against financing of terrorism is sufficiently specific,
universal, and obligatory. Id. at 1422.
176. Id. at 1420.
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international agreements require State parties to hold corporations
liable for certain conduct.177
Plaintiff reliance on the ATS as a remedy for human rights violations
continues. In October 2018, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Nestlé and
Cargill workers could sue the corporations under the ATS with
allegations of slave labor.178 While the plaintiffs’ counsel argued that
these claims “touch and concern” the United States because Nestlé’s
Headquarters in the United States decided to give money and
technological support to the foreign farmers,179 Nestlé argued that the
claim was barred because the focus was on an injury that occurred in
the Ivory Coast, not an alleged act of aiding and abetting that
happened in the United States.180 Thus, the appeals judges’ ruling in
favor of the plaintiffs demonstrates that the circuit split is likely to
continue regarding the dual issues of whether (1) a specific tort is
actionable under the ATS and (2) domestic corporations are
appropriate defendants under the ATS.181
III. ANALYSIS
The First Congress created the ATS as one mechanism to grant civil
redress and fulfill the government’s obligations under the law of
nations.182 By recognizing the law of nations as referring to

177. Id. at 1423–24 (cataloguing historical examples of corporate liability: the U.S.
Military Tribunal prosecuting corporate executives at Nuremberg; International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda finding a private radio station responsible for genocide; the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon holding that corporations may be prosecuted for contempt).
178. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018).
179. Id. at 1126; see also Anthony Myers, Nestle and Cargill Cocoa Slave Labor Lawsuit
Takes Another Twist as Appeal Judges Rule Plaintiffs Can Sue the Companies in the US,
CONFECTIONARY NEWS (Jun. 18, 2018), https://www.confectionerynews.com/Article/
2018/06/18/Nestle-and-Cargill-cocoa-slave-labor-lawsuit.
180. Nestle, 906 F.3d at 1125–26; see also Myers, supra note 179. In October 2018, the
Ninth Circuit allowed the ATS case against Nestlé to continue. See Erik Slobe, Nestle
Child Labor Case Allowed to Continue, JURIST (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.jurist.org
/news/2018/10/nestle-child-labor-case-allowed-to-continue (examining how the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal).
181. Compare Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1024 (7th
Cir. 2011) (refusing jurisdiction because that plaintiffs failed to prove that a norm
prohibiting child labor met the universality requirement of Sosa), with Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting jurisdiction
over a claim of cruel, inhuman treatment, even though the court found no universal
agreement on every element of the claim of crimes against humanity).
182. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History William R. Casto, Martin S.
Flaherty, Stanley N. Katz, Michael Lobban, and Jenny S. Martinez in Support of Plaintiffs-
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international law,183 the ATS becomes intertwined with norms of
customary international law and should remain true to its purpose to
provide recourse to wronged foreign plaintiffs.184 Because corporate
responsibility for violations of workers’ rights within supply chains is
crystallizing into a norm of customary international law, the ATS
provides foreign workers with a remedy to sue domestic parent
corporations for working conditions that amount to violations of
certain specific, universal norms. To the extent that Supreme Court
jurisprudence declines to find that certain other violations are
actionable torts under the ATS, the United States fails to provide
effective remedies to wronged workers and falls out of step with the
international movement that increasingly finds corporations liable for
a broader array of torts.
A. Corporate Responsibility for Violations of Workers’ Rights as a
Crystallizing Customary International Law Norm
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute lists customary law as one of four
recognized sources of international law.185 The product of State
practice and opinio juris, customary law is equally as binding upon
States as a ratified treaty.186 Although still in the drafting process, the
UN’s proposed binding treaty on business and human rights denotes
the strength of the movement to hold corporations responsible for
supply chain violations, under the standard that corporations should
have foreseen the risk of workers’ rights violations.187 Current

Appellants and Reversing the District Court’s Decision at 9–10, Doe v. Drummond Co., No.
13-15503 (Mar. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief], 2014 WL 1870571; see also id. at
2 (arguing that enforcing the law of nations requires sovereigns to provide redress for
violations “when the violation occurred on the sovereign’s territory; when a sovereign’s
subject committed the violation; and when a perpetrator used the sovereign’s territory as a
safe harbor to avoid punishment for having committed great wrongs”).
183. See Abdullahi ex rel. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003))
(clarifying the law of nations as referring to customary international law).
184. See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 182, at 27 (“To interpret the ATS to not
apply to U.S. subjects would go against the well-established rule that if a country did
not redress the wrongs of its subjects, it was an accessory to their wrongs.”).
185. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060.
186. See VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 58 (deeming customary law and treaties to be
equivalent sources of international law).
187. See generally U.N. Zero-Draft to Regulate Transnational Corporations, supra
note 40, art. 10, ¶ 6(b) (discussing the civil liability regimes State Parties should
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international and national behaviors and trends indicate that States
are increasingly able and willing to hold corporations responsible for
violations of workers’ rights within supply chains. Considering public
acts and official statements of policy as instructive of practice that
States follow as a matter of law, the trend of corporate responsibility
for the violations of workers’ rights in supply chains is crystallizing into
a norm of customary international law.
1. International acts demonstrate a crystallizing norm of corporate
responsibility for violations of workers’ rights
International movements toward establishing corporate responsibility
for the well-being of all “human components” within business
enterprises largely fall into two practices: guidelines that are binding or
suggestive and legislative acts of individual States.
The UN Guiding Principles serve as an overarching global
framework that exhorts corporations to promote business practices
that “mitigate adverse human rights impacts,” even if the corporations
have not directly contributed to those harmful impacts.188 While
international organizations have long maintained a general
recognition of the right to “favourable conditions of work,”189 over the
past decade alone international bodies have increased efforts to align
ethical business practices with respect for human rights. In 1998, the
ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work, which mandates that member States respect and promote the
elimination of deplorable practices such as forced and child labor.190
The ILO champions the campaign to equalize working conditions and,
with 187 member countries who can ratify conventions, can give weight
to growing trends based on the number of States that ratify various
conventions.191 For example, of the ILO’s eight fundamental
conventions, 182 States have ratified the Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention, 171 ratified the Minimum Age Convention, and 178

enforce on transnational corporations for violations of human rights “to the extent it
exhibits a sufficiently close relation with its subsidiary . . . in its supply chain”).
188. Implementing UNGPs, supra note 28, at 14.
189. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 7,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (promoting general
practices of healthy working conditions, fair wages, and reasonable rest days).
190. See ILO Declaration, supra note 25.
191. Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www
.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited June 1, 2019).
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ratified the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention.192 In ratifying
these conventions, member States affirm their commitment to abide
by the labor standards that each convention propagates.
Currently, the international community has placed renewed
emphasis on improving working conditions. Pursuant to the UN
Global Compact, the transfer from the Millennium Development
Goals (“MDGs”) to the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”)
represents a long-term commitment to promoting economic and
social development within States.193 Whereas the MDGs had no
mention of better working practices, Goal 8 of the SDGs calls for
“immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour” and the
protection of labor rights for all workers.194
Increasingly, non-binding regulations and guidelines have begun to
focus on the responsibilities of corporations in affirming the
protection of workers’ rights and eradicating abusive practices. Nonbinding declarations also demonstrate States’ willingness to adhere to
a greater degree of responsibility for businesses in reference to human
rights. The 2014 EU Directive on Non-Financial Reporting explicitly
called upon States to implement legislation requiring corporations to
divulge the social and environmental impacts of their subcontracting
chains, and by 2017, the national legislations of all EU Member States
contained complying disclosure rules.195 OECD’s transition from the
2011 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to the 2018 Due
Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Business Conduct further
depicts the renewed emphasis on corporate due diligence. Through
this transition, the OECD moved from encouraging business partners
to adopt certain working principles to implementing a governmentbacked due diligence standard in all economic sectors. These new
standards are backed by forty-eight of OECD’s member States.196
Respective States have also enacted legislation that regulates
corporate disclosure of possible slavery within supply chains, and the
growing movement for corporate responsibility supports the trend of a
192. Ratifications
by
Convention,
INT’L
LABOUR
ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12001 (last visited June 1, 2019).
193. SDGs, supra note 38, at 1–2.
194. See generally INT’L LABOUR ORG., SDG ALLIANCE: JOINING FORCES GLOBALLY TO
END CHILD LABOUR, FORCED LABOR, MODERN SLAVERY, AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2016),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/
publication/ wcms_450718.pdf (discussing target 8.7, which is part of the larger SDG Goal 8).
195. Implementation of EU Directive, supra note 46.
196. See New OECD Instrument, supra note 34.
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crystallizing customary norm. The landmark UK MSA was the first in a
relatively quick series of State-specific implementation of legislation.197
Within three years of the UK MSA’s introduction, France passed its own
vigilance law.198 With slight variations, each law introduced compliance
and disclosure plans that require corporations, which qualify based on
threshold gross receipts or employee numbers, to disclose their steps to
eradicate human slavery within their operations.199 Germany announced
its CSR Directive Implementation Act to mandate that corporations disclose
information about workers’ rights and provide an option for parent
companies to include individual disclosures within a main group report on
nonfinancial issues.200 The nonfinancial information must contain details on
workers’ issues, respect for human rights, and environmental impacts.201
These concrete legislative acts are joined by budding proposals from
other States. Joining its European counterparts, the Dutch Parliament’s
proposed Child Labour Due Diligence Law became yet another example
of how State governments are imposing duties on their corporations to
ensure the safety of their supply chains.202 A continent away, the Hong
Kong government released plans detailing the formation of its own antislavery law, which would require annual publishing of actions combatting
slavery.203 Hong Kong legislators imposed further restraints on corporate
power and await final approval of their bill that would allow civil actions
against defendants who benefited from business that they knew or should
have known would involve slavery.204

197. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (U.K.).
198. Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétiés des mères
et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 on the Corporate
Duty of Vigilance for Parent and Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 27, 2017 No. 99 (Fr.).
199. See, e.g., Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (requiring annual disclosures
from corporations who do business in the UK and have a global annual turnover of
more than £36m annually).
200. Gesetz zur Stärkung der nichtfinanziellen Berichterstattung der Unternehmen in
ihren Lage – und Konzernlageberichten [CSR Directive Implementation Act], April 2017,
BGBLI at 802 (GER); see also Von Steinau-Steinrück & Sura, supra note 49.
201. Von Steinau-Steinrück & Sara, supra note 49.
202. Oonk, supra note 52.
203. See Modern Slavery Law Proposed for Hong Kong, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Jan.
8, 2018) [hereinafter Hong Kong Proposed Law], https://www.herbertsmith
freehills.com/latest-thinking/modern-slavery-law-proposed-for-hong-kong (requiring
corporations conducting business in Hong Kong to “detail the steps taken that year to
ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place”).
204. Hong Kong Proposed Law, supra note 203.
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Prevalent adherence to the soft-law205 principles and guiding
documents propels the international acceptance of corporate
regulation into a practice that States increasingly adhere to as a matter
of law. Although difficult to ascertain, opinio juris206 manifests itself
through the deference States afford to conventions, directives, and
respective national policies that promote workers’ rights. For
example, while the 178 ratifying members of the ILO Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention indicates a consensus of State practice, the
ratification of the individual convention also represents a State’s
conviction that it must strive to abolish forced labor as a matter of
law.207 State endorsement of voluntary guidelines and principles
further conveys that a State feels bound to recognize corporate liability
for workers’ rights violations. Forty-eight States signed on to the new
OECD Guidelines that promote corporate due diligence among all
economic sectors,208 and States implemented the requirements of the
EU Directive on Non-Financial Information by transforming national
legislation to acknowledge the well-being of workers.209 Considering
the expansive implementation of national legislations restricting
corporate behavior and the emphasis on, and State compliance with,
international guidelines that promote corporate responsibility, the
practices of the international community indicate that corporate
responsibility for workers’ violations is a crystallizing norm of
customary international law.
2. U.S. domestic practice demonstrates the United States’ recognition of a
crystallizing customary international norm to promote corporate responsibility
Domestic regulation and disclosure efforts, bolstered by consistent
executive statements, indicate that the United States falls in line with the
growing international practice of holding corporations responsible for
the well-being of workers within their supply chains. Rather than objecting
to the growing international norm, the United States’ behavior evinces an
acceptance of the crystallizing customary norm of holding parent
corporations responsible for supply chain workers’ rights violations.210
205. See VILLIGER, supra note 109 (describing soft law).
206. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
207. Cf. VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 51 (“A vote cast in favour of a rule indicates a State’s
legal conviction, just as large majorities may serve as one indicator of a communis opinio juris.”).
208. See New OECD Instrument, supra note 34.
209. See Implementation of EU Directive, supra note 46.
210. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (describing that customary
international law is binding except upon States who are persistent objectors).
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The totality of legislative actions, implemented within the last
decade alone, indicate congressional willingness to impose due
diligence, disclosure requirements, and government oversight on
corporations to mitigate the risk of workers’ rights violations. Focused
solely on the federal sector, FAR imposes direct responsibilities upon
federal contractors to ensure that their subcontractors and involved
subsidiaries neither knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly,
partake in human trafficking.211 Federal contractors must produce and
adhere to compliance plans if their activities involve a certain
threshold of work abroad, and they must verify that they continue to
conduct their own due diligence investigations into the human impact
of their supply chains.212
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act further reaffirms the
government’s commitment to disavow connections to potential human
rights violations because it expressly requires corporations to disclose
whether their products contain conflict minerals;213 such a stipulation
requires, in part, that corporations have visibility into their supply
chains to accurately report as to the presence of conflict minerals.
Most comparable to international legislations’ disclosure laws, albeit
limited to enforcement in one state, California’s Transparency in
Supply Chains Act mandates that corporations provide consumers with
published information on the corporations’ efforts to eradicate
trafficking and slavery within their supply chains.214 Perhaps most
promising is the prospect of the pending Business Supply Chain
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act, which would impose
national compliance guidelines like those that the California Act
promulgates and require corporations to annually disclose efforts to
combat supply chain abuses.215
Efforts to restrict the flow of tainted goods into the United States
also evince a desire to restrict the imports of foreign-sourced goods
from corrupted supply chains. Through the TFTEA, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection exercises the power to restrict the importation of
goods from at-risk geographical areas or industries.216
211. Final FAR Rule Released, supra note 56.
212. Id.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1)–(b) (West 2012).
215. Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2018,
H.R. 7089, 115th Cong.
216. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, § 910, Pub. L. No. 114125, 130 Stat. 122, 239 (to be codified at scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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Executive statements or initiatives can serve as another factor that
bolsters the finding of a State practice adhered to as a matter of law.
Three of the last four Presidents have issued Executive Orders that
pertain to recognizing the necessity of workers’ rights while at the same
time abating the risk of associating with tainted goods or corrupt
practices. In 1999, President Clinton’s Executive Order 13,126,
“Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or
Indentured Child Labor,”217 intended to prevent federal agencies from
obtaining foreign goods produced by forced or child labor. In 2012,
President Obama introduced Executive Order 13,627, “Strengthening
Protections against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts,”218
which prohibited federal contractors and their employees from
engaging in human trafficking activities. Most recently, President
Trump continued the presidential disavowal of inhumane business
activities with his Executive Order 13,818, “Blocking the Property of
Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuses or Corruption,”219
which strengthened enforcement of the Global Magnitsky Act220 and
authorized the President to issue sanctions against global offenders of
human rights.221 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson even remarked that
the sanctions regime indicated that the government would continue to
pursue consequences for those who violate human rights.222 By
consistently aiming to prohibit involvement with goods or services tied
to workers’ rights violations within supply chains, the Executive Branch
has conveyed an awareness that the international community disfavors
associations that are connected to at-risk business enterprises.
The second element of customary international law, opinio juris, is
“the conviction of a State that it is following a certain practice as a
matter of law and that, were it to depart from the practice, some form

217. Exec. Order No. 13,126, 3 C.F.R. § 195 (2000).
218. Exec. Order No. 13,627, 3 C.F.R. § 309 (2013).
219. Exec. Order No. 13,818, 3 C.F.R. § 399 (2018) (“The United States seeks to
impose tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human
rights abuse or engage in corruption . . . .”).
220. See Kerry Contini & Eunkyung Kim Sum, US Government Implements the Global
Magnitsky Act and Publishes Magnitsky Act Sanctions Regulations and Related Designations,
GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Dec. 29, 2017), https://globalcompliancenews.com/usmagnitsky-act-20171229.
221. See Press Statement from Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State, supra note 69
(expressing that the sanctions demonstrate the United States will continue to pursue
consequences for those who commit serious human rights violations).
222. See id.
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of sanction would, or ought to, fall on it.”223 Thus, U.S. attentiveness
in controlling the imports of tainted goods through the TFTEA may
provide one indicia of acting under the sense of a broader legal
obligation. Executive invocation of the Global Magnitsky Act and
Executive Orders—consistent over three presidencies—can also
demonstrate desire to refrain from associating with sectors or
countries that have a risk of forced labor, which can lend support to
the possibility that the government follows such a practice under the
conviction that it might otherwise be subject to sanctions. Legislatively,
the government has imposed strict guidelines upon its contractors and
suppliers through the FAR requirements, and FAR expressly provides
for a mode of corporate liability for violations of workers’ rights that
occur within the contracting chains. Although opinio juris is often less
distinct than State practice, the consistency with which the United
States affirms the importance of clean supply chains while distancing
itself from at-risk industries and regimes demonstrate its subjective
understanding that protecting workers’ rights is a crystallizing
customary international norm.
B.

The Prohibition Against Workers’ Rights Violations as an ATSActionable Universal Norm

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, actionable ATS torts
must rise to the level of a violation of an international norm that is specific,
well-defined, and universal.224 Violations of workers’ rights can rise to the
level of Sosa standards when the violations are of a particularly egregious
nature, such as forced labor. To the extent that lesser violations may be
actionable torts, such violations would likely be precluded pursuant to the
Sosa standard, but preclusion would be inconsistent with international
momentum to uphold equitable working conditions.
The limited scope of the current ATS framework under Sosa
Sosa jurisprudence requires that actionable torts under the ATS are
specific, universal, and well-defined.225 Pursuant to those stipulations,
violations of the prohibitions against forced labor would provide
plaintiffs with actionable torts under ATS jurisprudence.

1.

223. VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 48.
224. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
225. Id. at 715.
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In Filartiga, the Second Circuit established that torture amounted to
a Sosa norm because of the universal renunciation of torture.226 As
evidence of this norm, the Second Circuit examined international
treaties and accords, such as the ICCPR and European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and
looked to modern national laws that banned torture.227 The Second
Circuit later deemed in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. that nonconsensual
medical experimentation violated international law and amounted to
the universal and specific nature of an actionable Sosa norm,228 after
once again looking to international treatment and the domestic
history of medical consent.229
Following the Second Circuit’s analytical approach—considering
historical evolution of and adherence to a standard—the prohibition
against forced labor fulfills the Sosa criteria of being universal, specific,
and well-defined. Internationally, under the ILO’s Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, member States have
pledged to promote the elimination of forced labor and child labor.230
The ILO defines forced labor as “all work or service which is extracted
from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which said
person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily.”231 The ILO has
187 member countries, which transitively implies that 187 countries

226. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980).
227. See id. at 884 (finding that over fifty-five national constitutions expressly or
implicitly renounced torture and relying on the State Department reporting a general
recognition of a principle against torture).
228. Abdullahi ex rel. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“The prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings
meets this standard because . . . it is specific, focused and accepted by nations around
the world without significant exception.”).
229. See id. at 180–82 (comparing the progression of the ICCPR Directive prohibiting
nonconsensual medical experimentation and the subsequent adoption of the CHRB by 34
Council of Europe members, with Congress’s mandate and FDA regulations regarding
patient-subject consent).
230. To note, the Conventions for the Abolition of Forced Labour and Child
Labour are the only two of the eight fundamental conventions that the United States
has ratified. See Ratifications for United States, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo
.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871
(last visited June 1, 2019).
231. What is Forced Labour, Modern Slavery, and Human Trafficking, INT’L LABOUR
ORG., https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/definition/lang--en (last
visited June 1, 2019).
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acknowledge the ILO’s characterization of forced labor. The ILO’s
fundamental conventions also include the abolition of forced labor.232
Goal 8 of the UN Development Programme specifically promotes
“tak[ing] immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced
labour . . . and secur[ing] the prohibition and elimination of the worst
forms of child labour,” with the provision to end child labour by
2025.233 The ILO’s Forced Labour Convention has 178 ratifying
countries,234 175 countries have ratified the Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention,235 and 182 countries have ratified the Worst
Forms of Child Labour Convention.236
Within the domestic sphere, the U.S. government has fought, and
continues to fight, the presence of forced labor within trade. The
Tariff Act of 1930237 defines “forced labor” as “all work or service which
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its
nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself
voluntarily” and prohibits the importation of goods produced by
convict or indentured labor.238 Pursuant to the TFTEA, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection has the authority and duty to prevent the
importation of goods possibly associated with forced labor.239
Although certain U.S. courts have already recognized slave labor as
a sufficiently defined norm that falls within the Sosa parameters,240

232. Abolition of Forced Labor, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/global
/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recomm
endations/lang--en (last visited June 1, 2019).
233. SDGs, supra note 38 (aiming to achieve productive employment and decent work
for all women and men by 2030); see also 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, U.N.,
2015, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.
234. C029—Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.29), INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P113
00_INSTRUMENT_ID:312174 (last visited June 1, 2019) (abstaining from ratifying:
the United States, China, Republic of Korea, and Afghanistan).
235. Ratifications of C105—Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), INT’L
LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0
::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312250 (last visited June 1, 2019).
236. Ratifications of C182—Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182),
INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:
11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327 (last visited June 1, 2019).
237. Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
238. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2012).
239. See Reade & Witten, supra note 63.
240. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see also Myers, supra note 179
(noting that the Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs to sue Nestlé and Cargill under the
ATS for allegations of slave labor).
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modern developments further exemplify just how appropriate and
suitable the ATS is for claims of forced labor.
2.

Why workers should have the right to bring ATS actions for “lesser” violations
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights serve as an
example of a collective body of rights that are essential yet whose
violations would likely fail the Sosa test to become actionable torts under
the ATS.241 The narrow Sosa standard prevents U.S. courts from hearing
ripe claims and precludes important violations from gaining jurisdiction.
For example, the United States has ratified the ILO convention against
the worst forms of child labor.242 However, under current Sosa
restrictions, U.S. courts would potentially lack the jurisdictional grant to
hear any claims based on violations of the prohibition against child labor.
For instance, in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,243 Liberian employees
and children attempted to bring a case against a corporate employer, but
the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to provide concrete
evidence of customs and practices of States to show that States feel
themselves to be under a legal obligation to impose liability on employers
of child labor.244 The court declined to find a universal, cohesive
perspective on child labor because of the diversity of economic conditions
around the world and found it difficult to glean a defined rule from
plaintiff’s three relied-upon conventions: UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child, ILO Minimum Age Convention, and ILO’s Convention 182:
The Worst Forms of Child Labor.245
Additionally, international courts have granted jurisdiction over
claims alleging corporate liability for violations of health and safety
conditions, violations which would likely fail under the Sosa test. A
German court allowed the continuation of a claim against a German
company, KiK, for a fire in a subsidiary-owned factory in Pakistan that

241. See Implementing UNGPs, supra note 28, at 1; see also Skinner, supra note 92, at
182 (citing the three pillars of the Guiding Principles, the second and third of which
emphasize businesses’ obligations to comply with all applicable laws and respect
human rights and the obligations of countries and businesses to provide victims with
access to effective remedies).
242. Ratifications for the United States, supra note 230.
243. 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
244. Id. at 1023.
245. Id. at 1024. But see Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that child labor violates a norm that is specific, universal, and well-defined);
Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (permitting an
ATS case to proceed when the plaintiffs presented a claim of child labor).
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occurred due to the factory’s lack of safety measures.246 Similarly, a
British court upheld jurisdiction for a case involving asbestos within a
corporation’s subsidiary company.247 Both aforementioned cases
would likely fail to meet the first threshold for ATS jurisdiction because
the alleged torts—violations of safe and healthy working conditions—are
not sufficiently specific to compare to the magnitude of the 1789 law of
nations norms of safe conducts, ambassador rights, and piracy. However,
the international community is championing a world that recognizes a
sustainable economy with decent working conditions, and fair working
conditions are arguably rising to, if not already at, the status of an
international norm. The 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development
evinces such a desire, as the introduction of the declaration calls for the
creation of conditions that promote shared prosperity and inclusive
economic growth for all,248 and Goal 8.8 of the Sustainable Development
Goals calls for safe working environments for all workers.249
Furthermore, the actions of various corporations and multinational
organizations indicates that they believe that safe working conditions
are a basic right worth protecting. Corporations are proactively
adapting their codes of conduct to mirror this trend,250 and public
opinion continues to advocate for greater corporate diligence in
ensuring safe working conditions. The federal courts’ continued
adherence to the Sosa standard, however, likely forecloses the
possibility of a foreign worker attaining redress from a parent
corporation for a workplace tort, therefore leaving the injured workers
without an effective remedy and arguably defeating the promising
246. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (examining the KiK case as an
example of signaling that courts can hold transnational corporations responsible for
workers’ violations stemming from subsidiaries’ working conditions).
247. See Green, supra note 99, at 459 n.51 (referring to Chandler v. Cape PLC,
[2011] EWCA (Civ) 525, wherein an asbestos-exposed worker was able to recover from
the subsidiary’s parent company).
248. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 37, at 3 (“We resolve also to create conditions for
sustainable, inclusive and sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work
for all, taking into account different levels of national development and capacities.”).
249. See id. at 20 (“Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working
environments for all workers . . . .”).
250. See, e.g., SAFEWAY, SUPPLIER SUSTAINABILITY GUIDELINES AND EXPECTATIONS 2 (2015),
https://suppliers.safeway.com/docs/supplier_sustainability_expectations.pdf;
Safety,
CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, https://cleanclothes.org/safety (last visited June 1, 2019)
(asserting that occupational health and safety are a “top priority in the struggle for better
working conditions in the garment industry”); Responsible Choice Seafood, HYVEE,
https://www.hy-vee.com/corporate/our-company/sustainability/responsible-choice-seaf
ood (last visited June 1, 2019) (promoting responsible, sustainable seafood practices).
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purpose of the ATS.251 In doing so, the United States has fallen out of
step with the international movement to hold corporations accountable
for the safety of workers within their supply chains.
C. Parent Corporation Liability for Extraterritorial Human Rights Abuses
within Global Supply Chains
The Supreme Court majority decision in Jesner significantly
restricted the ability of foreigners to bring claims against corporate
defendants because the majority held that foreign corporations are not
appropriate defendants under the ATS.252 However, the majority
refrained from conclusively specifying whether domestic corporations
remain suitable defendants. Accordingly, corporate civil liability
allows for foreign workers to bring claims against parent corporations
under the ATS. Suits against domestic parent corporations do not
implicate the Kiobel concerns of extraterritorial application because
traditional theories of tort liability connect the parent corporation to
the foreign acts of its subsidiaries.
1.

Piercing the corporate veil with foreseeable risk
Practices such as limited liability have historically shrouded
corporations from suit; however, international players are increasingly
relying on the law to directly impose duties or responsibilities on
corporations and “pierce the corporate veil.” Notably, TNCs have
acquired direct duties under some multilateral conventions that impose
liability on corporations.253 The UN Open-Ended Intergovernmental
Working Group is working on a proposed Treaty on Business and
Human Rights, and Article 10(1) of the current “zero draft” explicitly
identifies that legal persons may be held civilly liable for business activityrelated human rights violations.254
251. Cf. BREYER, supra note 12, at 134 (referring to the ATS as “a statute that helps
to protect basic human rights”); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976) (recognizing “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable
conditions of work”).
252. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399 (2018).
253. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 81, at 946 (identifying the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the Convention on Civil
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment as two
multilateral conventions that directly place liability on corporations).
254. See U.N. Zero-Draft to Regulate Transnational Corporations, supra note 40, art.
10, ¶ 1 (“State Parties shall ensure through their domestic law that natural and legal
persons may be held criminally, civil or administratively liable for violations of human

2019]

MODERN-DAY PIRATES

1975

Persuasively, international judicial systems have pierced the
corporate veil to find that parent corporations were liable for the
actions or omissions of their foreign subsidiaries. A German court
upheld a lawsuit that foreign workers brought against KiK, a German
company, for poor fire safety measures that contributed to a
destructive factory fire,255 while English courts held that parent
corporations owed a duty of care to subsidiaries’ employees in Chandler
v. Cape PLC,256 Lubbe v. Cape PLC,257 and Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources
PLC.258 Considering the four factors the Chandler court weighed before
imposing a direct duty on the parent corporation for the asbestos
conditions of its subsidiary259 and the call for transparent supply
chains,260 U.S. corporations should be on notice of the possibility of
rights undertaken in the context of business activities of transnational character. Such
liability shall be subject to effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal and noncriminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions. Liability of legal persons shall be
without prejudice to the liability of natural persons.” (emphasis added)).
255. See BUS. & HUM. RIGHTS RES. CTR., CORPORATE IMPUNITY IS COMMON & REMEDY
FOR VICTIMS IS RARE: CORPORATE LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY ANNUAL BRIEFING 10,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLA_AB_Fin
al_Apr%202017.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE IMPUNITY] (noting that the lawsuit could
signal to transnational corporations that they can be held responsible for working
conditions at subsidiaries and suppliers’ companies).
256. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (Eng.) (providing a cause of action against the parent
corporation for a worker exposed to asbestos while working for the extinct subsidiary).
257. [2000] UKHL 41, ¶ [6] (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that parent
corporation’s knowledge about a factory’s asbestos risk and superior knowledge about
the management of asbestos risk made it appropriate to find that the parent
corporation had a duty of care to advise subsidiary on remedial steps).
258. [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, ¶ [78] (Eng.) (finding that a parent corporation
owed a duty of care to residents harmed by the pollution discharge from the parent
corporation’s subsidiary mining company).
259. Considering whether the parent had assumed a direct duty of care for the
subsidiary’s employees, the court asked: (1) Are the businesses of the parent and
subsidiary in a relevant respect the same? (2) Does the parent have, or ought it to
have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular
industry? (3) Does the parent know (or ought to know) that the subsidiary’s system of
work is unsafe in some way? (4) Does the parent know (or ought to have foreseen)
that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for
the employees’ protection? Chandler, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, ¶¶ [72]–[80].
260. See, e.g., Urge Monster to Investigate Slavery Risk in its Drinks, FREEDOM UNITED,
https://www.freedomunited.org/advocate/monster-slavery (last visited June 1, 2019)
(encouraging Monster Beverage Corp. to investigate the minimal risk of slavery and
human trafficking in its supply chain after Monster also scored 0/100 in a report on
the largest food and beverage companies addressing forced labour); Clare LeschinHoar, Was Your Seafood Caught with Slave Labor? New Database Helps Retailers Combat
Abuse, NPR (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:01 AM) (quoting Maisie Ganzler, Chief Strategy and Brand
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workers’ rights violations within their global supply chains. The
Chandler court considered a key question to be: should the parent have
known that the subsidiary’s work system risked workers’ rights?261
Given the current domestic and international push for regulatory
disclosure and due diligence,262 U.S. parent corporations should
reasonably foresee the risk of violations within their supply chains,
such that parent corporations should be responsible for violations
because they breached the duty of care they owed to the workers within
their supply chains. Corporate social responsibility is effectively
trending and topically at the forefront of multinational organizations
of which the United States is a member.263 Domestically, the United
States has previously demonstrated a willingness to find corporations
liable for human rights violations under certain conditions.264
Legislatively, the FAR epitomizes parent liability through its flow-down
provisions by which contractors will be responsible for commissions and
omissions of subcontractors and agents at each tier of the supply chain.265
Although the FAR only applies to government contractors,266 the
willingness to find parent contractor liability for acts along the supply
chain indicates that such a chain of liability is possible and in practice.
Notably, U.S. corporations are stepping up and altering their
workplace codes of conduct to comply with the international focus on
corporate social responsibility.267 Through these voluntary commitments,
corporations are thereby acknowledging—at least to an extent—that an
onus is on them to manage their societal impact. Regardless of whether
corporations knew of workers’ rights violations within their supply chains,
corporations should have foreseen the possibility of such a risk and
therefore should not be able to evade responsibility.

Officer at Bon Appétit Management Company, who stated that “[t]he reality is that no
company right now can be 100 percent sure there’s no slavery in the supply chain”).
261. Chandler, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 ¶ [33].
262. See supra Part I.
263. See, e.g., SDGs, supra note 38 (“[E]radicate forced labour, end modern slavery
and human trafficking”); INT’L LABOUR CONF., supra note 17, at 5 (focusing on the
human rights impact of global supply chains).
264. See Herz, supra note 98, at 224 (detailing the intentions of the Sullivan
Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa); see also Sullivan Principles,
supra note 93 (promoting equal employment practices for U.S. corporations in
apartheid South Africa).
265. Final FAR Rule Released, supra note 56.
266. Id.
267. See supra Section I.A.2.
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Displacing the Kiobel presumption against extraterritoriality
In Kiobel, the majority held that even when claims “touch and concern”
the United States, the claims need to do so with “sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extra-territorial application.”268 The
Kiobel court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Nigerian
corporation because it found that all relevant conduct took place outside
the United States and emphasized the importance of not wanting to
create a precedent where other countries could hale U.S. citizens into
foreign courts for alleged violations of international law.269 However,
these judicial concerns do not carry the same weight in claims against
domestic parent corporations.
Significantly, allowing claims against parent corporations would not
entail hauling foreign nationals into domestic courts because the
concerned parent corporations would have been incorporated in the
United States. Additionally, jurisdiction over alleged violations of
workers’ rights within global supply chains would not unduly interfere
with the power of other political branches. In Al Shimari, the Fourth
Circuit upheld jurisdiction over an ATS claim for torture abroad and
specifically noted that allowing further litigation would not interfere
with U.S. foreign policy because the political branches had already
demonstrated that the United States would not tolerate acts of
torture.270 With specific reference to supply chains and corporate
liability, current congressional legislation suggests that permitting
courts to hear ATS claims against domestic corporations for acts
abroad would not unduly interfere with foreign policy.271
Further, connecting the parent corporation to the acts of its
subsidiaries through modes of tort liability could displace
presumptions against extraterritorial application. Superior or agency
liability theories prevent corporations from remaining free of
responsibility for actions within their supply chains.272 Directly linking
corporations to the failures of their subsidiaries would encourage
vigilance in avoiding the corporate excuse of ignorance as to poor
operational practices and instead offer victims the appropriate avenue
2.

268. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013) (Alito, J.,
concurring); see also supra notes 145–51 and accompanying text.
269. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25.
270. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014).
271. See supra Section I.A.2.
272. See KOEBELE, supra note 94, at 297 (introducing the agency principle as
imposing liability based on contract concepts of a fiduciary relationship between a
principal and agent).
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for redress from the parent corporation.273 Given that holding
domestic parent corporations responsible for the commissions or
omissions of their foreign subsidiaries would neither implicate the
Kiobel presumption against extraterritoriality nor unduly surprise the
corporate defendants, courts should recognize domestic parent
corporations as appropriate defendants under the ATS for workers’
rights violations within global supply chains.
CONCLUSION
The Jesner dissent emphasized that the true lingering ATS question
must remain, “Who are today’s pirates?”274 Piracy, historically involving
high seas conduct and ships considered stateless, fell under no specific
national jurisdiction.275 Pirates, enemies of all mankind, could
accordingly be prosecuted wherever found, regardless of their
nationality or where the piratic acts occurred.276 Today, corporations
are pirates: corporations have global reach, yet can often act with
relative impunity in advancing their enterprises.277 Corporations are
arguably the most appropriate defendants under the ATS because they
are global actors with power over individuals and, importantly, they are
increasingly independent of government control.278 A foreign
worker’s ability to sue a parent corporation in federal court under the
ATS could incentivize corporations to undertake more diligent
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compliance obligations. If corporations know that the ATS remains an
open door for foreign supply chain workers to have access to U.S.
courts, these parent corporations could investigate and improve the
transparency of their supply chains to tackle the risk of labor violations.
Although the current Sosa and Kiobel-colored ATS jurisprudence
narrowly construes definitions of actionable torts and defendants,
under the current international corporate social responsibility
movement U.S. courts should hold the ATS doors open for foreign
supply chain workers. U.S. parent corporations are, or should be,
aware of the risk of workers’ rights violations within their supply chains,
and many corporations have shouldered the responsibility by
improving their workplace codes of conduct. In finding in favor of the
plaintiff in Filartiga, the Second Circuit reasoned that “courts must
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved
and exists among the nations of the world today.”279 As international
law exists among the nations of the world today, corporations have
greater social and legal obligations to disclose and take responsibility
for the human impact of their global supply chains. Accordingly, the
ATS remains one of the most vital pathways into U.S. courts for
wronged foreign workers.
If U.S. courts truly have an interest in preventing the nation from “serving
as a safe harbor for today’s pirates,”280 the courts should recognize a broader
array of actionable torts under the ATS and allow foreign workers to bring
suits under the ATS to hold domestic parent corporations responsible for
workers’ rights violations within their global supply chains.
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